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Richard Eldridge

Acknowledging the Moral Law
Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgment.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §378

I
Once upon a time, almost forty years ago, when it was still common for graduate
students to take qualifying examinations in various subfields of philosophy,
there was—so the lore among the graduate students had it—a standard, expected
reply to the question “Why be moral?” One was supposed to divide one’s answer
into two cases. If the question were understood as asking “What self-interested,
prudential reasons are there to be moral?”, then the answer is “obviously none;
often enough one will be either inconvenienced or otherwise disadvantaged by
doing what one has, for example, promised to do.” Alternatively, if the question
were understood as asking “What moral reasons are there to be moral?”, then the
answer is “obviously whatever moral reasons one has; it is essential to the distinctive force of moral reasons that they cannot be reduced to other sorts of reasons.”¹
In retrospect, both these lines of response to the question “why be moral?”
are, at best, evasive, and we have, happily, to some extent learned to think more
deeply about how moral reasons make claims on us. In large part, this new
thinking has been spurred by Bernard Williams’s questioning of the absolute authority of distinctively moral reasons (to do one’s duty, to keep one’s promises,
etc.) and his urging of the importance in contrast of the ethical: a set of openended, plural, nonsystematizable considerations about values—moral, prudential, political, intellectual, aesthetic, and otherwise—that one might articulate
and to which one might appeal more or less reasonably and improvisatorially
in order to make sense of one’s life.² As Derek Parfit puts it in endorsing Wil-

 Notably, Bernard Williams characterizes Kantian morality in general as making use of this
dilemma and as then, vacuously as he sees it, embracing its second horn. See Williams ,
pp.  – .
 Alasdair MacIntyre’s questioning in After Virtue of the authority of modern liberal morality
and his urging of a modified form of virtue ethics have also been influential (MacIntyre ).
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liam’s recommendation that we take up the Socratic question, “how should one
live?,”³
We should ask what we have reasons to care about, and to try to achieve. […] Reasons are, I
believe, fundamental. Something matters only if we have reason to care about this thing. It
would have great importance if morality did not in this sense matter, because we had no
reason to care whether our acts were right or wrong. To defend and explain morality’s importance, we can claim and try to show that we do have such reasons. Morality might have
supreme importance in the reason-implying sense, since we might always have decisive
reasons to do our duty, and to avoid acting wrongly. But if we defend morality’s importance
in this way, we must admit that the deepest question is not what we ought morally to do,
but what we have sufficient or decisive reasons to do.⁴

While Parfit here displays an admirable forthrightness in taking seriously Williams’s question about the authority of morality—in asking for reasons for
being moral—his own response to this question arguably suffers from both insensitivity to available possibilities of practical reasoning and incoherence.⁵
Worse yet, Parfit, in his relentless hunt for binding reasons to be moral, skates
over the most important insights of Williams’s philosophical anthropology that
make the question about the authority of morality significant for us, especially
Williams’s sense that we are fragile beings for whom achievements of the
good, even sometimes life itself, are hostage to fortune and dependent on our
relations with specific others. As Williams observes, we are now in some respect
closer to the Greeks—and perhaps even closer to them now than we have been
for the last forty years or two millennia—than has often been supposed, particularly in feeling the legitimate force of the claims of personal relations and in
feeling bound up in processes we can neither escape nor master, all while lacking the comforts of belief in literal bodily resurrection after death.⁶

 Williams , p. . Williams goes on to remark “I shall not try to define what counts exactly
as an ethical consideration; … it does no harm that the notion is vague” (p. ). Roughly, ethical
considerations turn out to be for Williams any considerations—moral, economic, political, aesthetic, prudential, sexual, familial, and so on—that bear seriously on how one should live as the
person who one most deeply is.
 Parfit , II, p. , I. p. .
 In reviewing Parfit’s book, Samuel Freeman notes i) that Parfit regards the only options in
metaethics as either extreme rationalism or extreme subjectivism, thus missing a range of available intermediate stances, and ii) that Parfit combines a Kantian concern for absolute human
rights with utilitarian concern for human welfare in a way that is never made fully clear in relation to hard cases where these concerns might clash. (Freeman, , pp.  – .)
 See Williams , p. .

Acknowledging the Moral Law

201

This philosophical anthropology has important consequences for how we
should think about philosophy as a discipline or activity. We should abandon
what Williams called the bogus “aspiration to a total critique,”⁷ give up the attempt to arrive at a view from nowhere, as if we might, by doing so, make ourselves immune to fortune and certain of our own moral worth and purity. Instead, we should accept our embeddedness in natural processes and personal
and social relations. Philosophy is, or should be if it is honest, as Williams
puts it, a matter of trying to “make the best sense of our life, and so of our intellectual activities, in the situation in which we find ourselves.”⁸ Normative relations, including for example semantic relations, are instituted by us in the
course of our complex practical lives, and they are subject to historical variation.
(Williams cites with approval R. G. Collingwood’s remark that certain practitioners of putatively ahistorical and absolute analysis of concepts proceed by, as it
were, “translating the Greek word for a trireme as a ‘steamship’ and then complain[ing] that the Greeks had a defective conception of a steamship.”⁹) Philosophy should not be disjoined from history; making sense of semantic and other
normative phenomena must involve paying reflective attention to concept-words
in actual use and subject to change. We should not suppose that our own stocks
of concepts could or should be perfectly in order.
Pointedly, we should not suppose that we are morally superior to the Greeks.
Among them, “slavery, in most people’s eyes, was not just, but necessary.”¹⁰
Most Greeks could not imagine a world without it. Rightly, we take this to be a
failing on their part. But our own attitudes toward economic immiseration and
degradation are not so dramatically different, insofar as many of us unreflectively accept radical inequalities that we regard as in principle unjust as the necessary price of significantly rising GDP. Worse yet, under the banner of unrestricted
property rights, freedom of contract, and economic efficiencies, some of us celebrate radically immiserating and degrading property arrangements as just, even
though all property holdings are matters of institutional arrangement, not of natural right and clean historical descent. In some ways, the Greeks confronted the
difficult facts of their historical situation more forthrightly than we sometimes
confront ours.
Nor is our moral psychology obviously in much better shape than that of the
Greeks, since there is no possibility of pure guilt or the verdict of conscience simply as such, arising from an inner confrontation with the bare moral law. Rather,
 Williams , p. .
 Williams , p. ; emphasis added.
 Williams , p. .
 Williams , p. .
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as Williams argues, drawing on Nietzsche, guilt before a sense of what is morally
required of one is itself a refined and abstracted form of shame. As Williams puts
it, “shame can understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself. …Only
shame [not guilt] can … help one to understand one’s relations to [wrongs one
has done or might do], because it [unlike guilt] embodies conceptions of what
one is and of how one is related to others.”¹¹ And this is because, as Nietzsche
together with Freud (on the formation of the superego) have taught us, the voice
of conscience that proclaims guilt before the moral law is itself the voice of an
internalized other that has been modeled on and abstracted from some actually
existing other, with authoritative standing, within social-ethical life.¹² Any other
picture of how we come to have senses of duty and obligation—any picture that
posits a pure practical reason within, or responsiveness to the voice of God, capable of operating quite independently of the internalization of admiration, respect, fear, and so on toward actually existing others—is simply horribly unrealistic. True, we can abstract and generalize away from the evaluative stances of
the particular others we have encountered, partly because we encounter many
others with many distinct evaluative stances. But however far it goes, such abstraction and generalization continue to bear some traces of some actually existing encountered and internalized others. In Williams’s summary formulation,
By giving through the emotions a sense of who one is and of what one hopes to be, [shame,
along with its later abstracted and derivative form, guilt] mediates between act, character,
and consequence, and also between ethical demands and the rest of life. Whatever it is
working on, it requires an internalized other, who is not designated merely as a representative of an independently identified social group, and whose reactions the agent can respect. After some time, this figure does not merely shrink into a hanger for those same values but embodies intimations of a genuine social reality—in particular of how it will be for
one’s life with others if one acts in one way rather than another.¹³

Finally, Williams is right that consequences of actions, even unintended ones,
sometimes matter. It is at least sometimes appropriate to feel regret for what
one has done, even if one did not intend to do it or even intended specifically
not to do it. As Hegel trenchantly puts it, “‘The stone belongs to the devil
when it leaves the hand that threw it.’ When I act, I allow for bad luck, so it
has a right over me and is an existence of my own willing.”¹⁴ We would do better
to learn to live with this fact rather than denying it. Or as Williams puts it, “we






Williams , pp.  – .
Williams , p. .
Williams , p. .
Hegel , p. .
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know that in the story of one’s life there is an authority exercised by what one
has done, and not merely by what one has intentionally done.”¹⁵
Given all this—the fragility of goodness, the properly historical character of
philosophical thinking about normativity, the developmental priority of shame
over guilt, and the fact of moral luck—why should we not, as Williams urges,
content ourselves with a looser “conception of the ethical that understandably
relates to us and our actions the demands, needs, claims, desires, and, generally,
the lives of other people”¹⁶ in various ways? Why, if at all, should we embrace
what Williams calls “the purity of morality” with its “‘must’ that is unconditional
and goes all the way down”?¹⁷

II
Throughout both Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy and Shame and Necessity,
Kantianism, with its sterile and impotent conception (as Williams sees it) of distinctively moral reasons that absolutely bind us from nowhere—in contrast with
broader ethical reasons that arise within the course of life—is the official target.¹⁸
At first blush, moreover, Kant’s account of the authority of morality can indeed
seem both inhuman in being insensitive to the conduct of practical life on the
ground and distressingly dogmatic. Not only does he simply claim that “the
moral law is given, as it were, as a fact of pure reason of which we are a priori
conscious and which is apodictically certain,”¹⁹ he also describes awareness of
this fact as a matter of “conscientiousness … as accountability to a holy being
(morally lawgiving reason) distinct from us yet present in our inmost being.”²⁰
Hence he is at least committed to a doctrine of a split in the human subject between an empirical part and a pure rational part. At best, this split can seem obscure. Hence to make Kantian distinctively moral reasons count for us would
seem to have to mean something like training our defective, empirical, desiring,

 Williams , p. .
 Williams , p. .
 Williams, pp. , .
 See the pages from (Williams ) cited in note  and also p. : “Hegel admirably criticized the ‘abstract’ Kantian morality and contrasted it with the notion of Sittlichkeit, a concretely
determined ethical existence that was expressed in the local folkways, a form of life that made
particular sense to the people living in it.” As Williams immediately adds, his own position is a
Hegelian defense of Sittlichkeit stripped, however, of any reference to teleology.
 Kant b, p. .
 Kant c, p. .
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relationship-embedded, and project-having nature to be more at home with reasons that are indifferent to that nature. ²¹ Rightly, that can seem a very tall order,
perhaps too tall.²²
It is, after all, true that human beings in the course of their individual developmental lives from infancy onwards find themselves having projects and desires and are situated within relationships that have force for them. Why then,
if at all, should distinctively moral reasons, involving universal and impersonal
respect for persons, function as a kind of standing counterforce that checks and
corrects the commitments we already have?
If there is an answer to this question, it must involve seeing the emergence of
distinctively moral commitments out of an enormous variety of developmental
backgrounds, both individual and social-historical, as displaying a kind of
path independence. That is, just as pebbles dropped from various positions
above the top of a well may follow a variety of distinct paths, including bouncing
off the sides of the well in various ways, they will nonetheless each end up at the
bottom of the well.²³ This is, of course, due to gravity. Could—and should—the
moral law have for us anything like the dispositive force of gravity, in bringing
each of us to acknowledge its authority, despite our strikingly distinct individual
and social paths? And here it is obvious that, while in some possible world, perhaps, this could happen, it scarcely seems likely as a matter of empirical fact that
it has happened or is about to happen.

 I owe this formulation to Robert Guay, who provided a series of well-considered, close, critical comments on an earlier draft of this essay and whose own defense of a Nietzschean ethical
contextualism, along lines similar to those of Williams, was much on my mind in revising my
argument.
 Terry Pinkard, for example, describes “the notion of the ‘fact of reason’” as “a restatement of
the quasi-paradoxical formulation of the authority of the moral law itself, which seems to require a ‘lawless’ agent to give laws to himself on the basis of laws that from one point of
view seem to be prior to the legislation and from another point of view seem to be derivative
from the legislation itself,” and he argues that this paradox can be overcome only by replacing
Kant’s appeal to pure practical reason in the individual with an account of the logic of doubling
(Verdopplung) of agency among multiple subjects, each of whom is struggling to impose demands on others and to secure their recognition as reasonable (Pinkard , pp. , ).
Karl Ameriks observes similarly that “if the source [of the moral law] is elevated into something
even partly outside the world, then even when it is not personified as a literally separate and
self-subsisting entity, it can still seem too odd and remote to explain why human agents should
feel bound by it.” (Ameriks , pp.  – ); see also p. , where Ameriks observes that
“this can all sound too remarkable to be true.”
 I owe this useful analogy to Sam Baron, who suggested it during discussion of a version of
this paper, subsequent to presenting it to the philosophy department of the University of Western
Australia.
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It is noteworthy that Kant himself held that consciousness of the moral law
is not explicitly present in the consciousness of any human being from the moment of conception or birth. As he remarks in the Foundations, “innocence is indeed a glorious thing [though] it is sad that it cannot well maintain itself, being
easily led astray.”²⁴ Here innocence must consist in a time of life before one has
become conscious of the moral law as binding normatively against the force of
inclination. Likewise, in “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” Kant remarks, drawing on both Genesis and Milton,²⁵ that in the history of mankind “instinct … must alone have guided the novice” well before “reason began to stir.”²⁶
What, then, might the process of coming to awareness of the moral law look like?
And what, if anything, might move us to think that this process is something that
should take place within any individual’s course of development?
We should not suppose, however, that a description of any such process will
provide an empirical explanation of the origin, content, and authority of the
moral law. It must, at least within a Kantian framework, be the case that the
human subject autonomously exercises rational powers in coming to acknowledge the moral law. Nor will such a description provide an independent justification of the content and authority of the moral law, apart from a free act of rational acknowledgment that must be carried out by each agent. In this sense, the
content and authority of the moral law cannot be proven to a moral skeptic.²⁷
The best one can do is to supply neither an empirical explanation nor an independent justification but rather, as Ameriks puts it, “just many layers of illuminating description” that capture how sometimes one may find oneself “in the situation of being able to maintain one’s rationality only by [actively]
acknowledging the pure practical law as compelling.”²⁸
In his “History” essay, Kant himself develops in some detail the idea of the
moral law coming to have authoritative normative force for us in a path-independent way. At the end of the first paragraph of that essay, Kant observes that
While [among individual human beings and even whole nations] each pursues its own aim
in its own way and one often contrary to another, they are proceeding unnoticed, as by a

 Kant , p. .
 For an extended account of Kant’s adaptation of Milton’s account of a procedure of succession (Nachfolgung, Nachmachung) as essential for coming to self-conscious maturity, see (Budick
).
 Kant , p. .
 Hence there is something right about embracing the second horn of the dilemma with which
this essay began.
 Ameriks , p. ; compare the account of the acknowledgment of the moral law in Eldridge , pp.  – .
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guiding thread [an einem Leitfaden], according to an aim of nature [Naturabsicht], which is
unknown to them, and are laboring at its promotion.²⁹

Here the guiding thread is explicitly the normative force with which human beings in various circumstances are drawn toward life on the ground according to
the requirements of the moral law, no matter what diverse paths they may take
toward this end and what other commitments they may also have. We are, as
Kant puts it repeatedly in the Religion, each to live up to the “idea of a human
being morally well-pleasing to God” [“Idee eines Gott moralisch wohlgefälligen
Menschen”],³⁰ and we are to do so by creating first a lawful civic order in which
each possesses the maximum degree of liberty compatible with the like liberty of
all and second a kingdom of ends, that is, a moral culture of mutual respect and
achieved concrete life according to reason.
Following this guiding thread—that is, moving toward life according to the
moral law whose normative authority one accepts—is said, further, to take
place “according to an aim of nature.” In this context, “nature” cannot mean
“the realm of empirical objects” or “nature as the object of study of the natural
sciences,” for nature in those senses has no aims or purposes [Absichten].³¹ Instead Kant must mean something more like Spinozist natura naturans or “nature
as God has made it to be purposive” (even where such purposes are not empirically discernible), in contrast with natura naturata. Nonetheless, one may still
wonder: why should we be drawn normatively by the thought that we are participants in natura naturans or members of an intelligible world? The empirical
world of ordinary objects is real enough and unavoidable, and we lack, both
by Kantian lights and in fact, theoretical knowledge of any such higher order
or world undergirding the ordinary world. Hence talk of a normatively dispositive noumenal nature of which we are members may seem to be little advance
over sheer dogmatism, and such talk is, again, at best redescriptive of what
we are implicitly and immanently committed to in virtue of our deliberative powers; it is neither an empirical explanation of morality nor an independent justification of it.

 Kant c, p. .
 Kant e, p.  and infra. Note, however, that to be well-pleasing to God just is to act
from respect for the moral law; Kant, of course, does not put forward a divine command morality, and belief in (a thin, non-personal) God is derived from the requirements of the moral
life rather than vice versa.
 See Ameriks , p.  for a useful account of ambiguities attaching to Kant’s uses of
“nature.”
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Is this redescriptive sketch of our powers and possibilities of acknowledging
our membership in a noumenal world and accepting the authority of Kantian
morality, from within divergent local circumstances, apt and illuminating?
Since this is a question about powers and possibilities that is, moreover, couched
in metaphorical language, answering it is not a straightforward matter of empirical observation or measurement alone.³² But while observation alone cannot
settle the matter, we might nonetheless draw reflectively, normatively, and critically on developmental psychology and, roughly, on the theory of ego formation
for some help. Here it is useful to turn to an account of ego formation that is both
pre-Freudian and directly concerned with how awareness of the Kantian moral
law as making an authoritative normative demand might arise in the course of
subject development.
In his 1795 essay “On the Concept of Punishment,” Friedrich Hölderlin takes
up exactly this topic. As Thomas Pfau usefully puts it, “with the concept of punishment as a ratio cognoscendi of a primordeal order where ‘freedom and necessity’ seem to have converged, Hölderlin implicitly introduces a temporal marker
into Kant’s conceptual system.”³³ That is, in describing the experience of punishment as punishment, Hölderlin seeks to trace how explicit awareness of the normative authority of the moral law arises within the life of a living human subject,
not as a matter of derivation from experience alone, but rather through a dawning exercise of one’s distinctive powers as a subject. Here Hölderlin’s first move
is to argue that what is evil or wrong cannot simply be defined as behavior that is
punished, that is, as behavior that results in suffering. If that were the case, then,
as Hölderlin puts it, “I [would] also deduce an evil will,” that is, take myself to
have done something wrong, something that ought not to have been willed,
“from any other resistance” or experience of suffering. In that case, “all suffering
[would count as] punishment.”³⁴ That, surely, is not right. Being caught in the
rain and catching a chill may be the result of imprudent action, and it may involve suffering, but it is not a case of being punished by the weather for a
moral transgression, nor is stumbling over a crack in the sidewalk and bruising
one’s knee. What, then, must be added to the experiences of suffering and resistance to one’s will in order to have an experience of punishment? Here Hölderlin
writes, in a fragment that breaks off:

 This is, of course, the truth of the claim that ought cannot be derived from is, as long as is
claims are restricted to what is straightforwardly empirically observable or measurable.
 Pfau , p. .
 Hölderlin b, p. .
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To this it may be answered that, insofar as one considers oneself punished, one necessarily
implies the transgression of the law within oneself; that in punishment, insofar as one considers it punishment, necessarily […].³⁵

Thus what is crucial is that one considers oneself to be punished, that is, to have
done something that merits suffering as imposed by another agent who is enforcing normative demands appropriately. (The relevant suffering can include things
like being required to sit on the stairs and think about what one has done; it
need not involve only physical pain.) One must grasp that one is suffering appropriately in virtue of having done something one ought not to have done, according to the standards of another agent who is authoritative for one.³⁶ This grasp
has an empirical component—one must have done something and met a reversal—but its content is not entirely empirical, insofar as it includes an emerging
awareness of what one ought not to have done in virtue of appropriate standards.
Pointedly, this awareness of being punished according to appropriate standards
arises in the course of the experience of punishment and reflection on it. Awareness of standards of appropriateness is more an aspect of this reflective experience in a context than it is something already formed and brought to that experience from outside it.
It is possible for there to be human beings, perhaps sociopaths, who do not
have such experiences of having been punished appropriately. It is also important to note that having such an experience is not required for being a subject,
in the sense of someone who has and is aware of having at least a spatial and
subjective point of view on things, including having preferences.³⁷ Nor is it necessary for being a person, in the sense of someone who is able and entitled
under law to make transactions, bring lawsuits, and so forth (perhaps doing
so in a pathological spirit). Subject and person are role- or status-concepts,
and it is possible, though happily not normal, to play the relevant roles or to acquire the relevant status without, as it were, developing a conscience. Someone
who experienced sufferings and reversals, including corrections by others, but
without developing a sense of sometimes having been appropriately punished,

 Hölderlin b, p. .
 This is the truth (consider: ‘meaning’) of Williams’s claim that shame is prior to guilt, since
the explicit articulation of what the standard of appropriateness is will come after the experience of simply having transgressed an authoritative other’s standard.
 Hence Christine Korsgaard, in taking commitment to the normative authority of the categorical imperative to be part of constituting oneself as a subject, builds too much into a kind of
individual faculty psychology and too little into what emerges in interaction with other subjects.
See Korsgaard . But then Korsgaard is right that powers inherent to the subject must also be
brought into play in this interaction in order to yield this commitment.
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would be, as it were, aspect-blind to the existence of an authoritative normative
order, blind to the sense that there are things that simply ought not and ought to
be done. Though pathologies of development that issue in forms of moral aspectblindness are possible, they too are happily not normal.
There is, moreover, room for radically significant variation both in behaviors
that are punished and in senses of standards of appropriate punishment that
may emerge from them. What gets punished and in what ways is in fact significantly different in different cultures. At least in the first instance, then, the experience of punishment as suffering in virtue of having violated appropriate normative standards need not, and sometimes does not, involve any sense of having
violated any single distinctively moral law, let alone a Kantian one.³⁸ Children
and others are in fact punished for all sorts of things, including varieties of rudeness, uncleanliness, acting out, clumsiness, lack of self-control, and so forth,
sometimes inappropriately and unjustly so. As a result they sometimes develop
standards of appropriate punishment, standards that they may then enforce and
transmit, that are in fact themselves unjust and inappropriate. Across cultures
and differences in socio-cultural circumstances, what gets punished, what is experienced as punishment, and what is taken to be appropriate punishment may
vary widely.
Is there then any reason to think that reference to a single moral law along
Kantian lines, such as the formula of respect for persons, could figure and
should figure nonetheless in any experiences of punishment as punishment
and any developments of conscience? Perhaps the most obvious and straightforward answer to this question is “No; morality in its distinctively Kantian form
does have its distinctive socio-cultural circumstances and settings.” But while
it is true that there are primitive conditions of life, say, where the development
of Kantian conscience may not be a reasonable part of the development of conscience as such, this is much less likely to be the case in complex societies,
where one is subject to correction and reversal throughout the course of one’s
life, from infancy onwards, from a variety of authoritative others who themselves
have distinct subjective points of view and commitments. Suppose, then, that
within a setting of significant interaction with a wide range of diverse others,
one simply stood imaginatively, as it were, on the normative authority of only
a few, readily identifiable distinct others (perhaps one’s parents, perhaps members of a dominant social caste). That is, one experiences punishment as punishment and one develops a sense of appropriate normative standards for it and for

 This, too, is an insight that Williams has registered, in noting the existence and force for us
of highly pluralized ‘ethical’ demands.
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action in general, only insofar as these standards are instituted and maintained
by members of group G whom one respects and whom feels one must respect. If
members of groups H, I, J and so on that one encounters turn out to have different normative standards for appropriate behavior and punishment, then they are
simply not to be taken seriously. Perhaps they are members of a dominated and
dependent group that one cannot respect or members of a dominant group
whom one fears but with whom one does not identify, or perhaps they are simply
other, tribally, racially, sexually, economically, or whatever. What if one simply
stopped there, in attachment to only the normative standards of distinct group
G? This, too, is surely possible and, sadly, often enough actual. Is there any reason to think that this stance is also pathological or a form of normative aspectblindness?
This question has no ready answer. Attempting to answer it is complicated
by the fact that different individuals with different socio-cultural backgrounds
may use the same abstract, more or less Kantian language of rights, duties,
and respect for persons, but differ dramatically in how they assess individual
cases on the ground. What you call telling someone a hard truth out of respect,
I call inconsiderate cruelty; or what you call encouragement to develop one’s talents and specific forms of self-respect I call indulgence and pampering. Mistakes
and errors on all sides are possible, including, and perhaps especially, in describing and judging one’s own conduct. What counts as respect for persons is
itself a subject for open, imaginative, explorative inquiry and moral conversation
in an ongoing way, even where the value of respect for persons is abstractly
shared.³⁹
But should respect for persons, however contested and evolving its criteria
be, figure centrally in the development of any form of conscience arising out
of the experience of punishment as punishment? This is a normative, not a factual question. Again, in fact not everyone develops a conscience of this kind,
whether out of significant rudeness of circumstances, radical tribalism, or social
pathology (as a Kantian view would see it). But it is a normative question that
admits of some argument, even if not a priori proof—argument that points toward answering “Yes.” For what would it be like simply to live, without further
normative reflection, according to the normative standards of (let us say) one’s
own group G, thence ignoring, dismissing, or violently repudiating the claims
 This is one way of taking the point of Stanley Cavell’s continuing emphasis on the importance of mutually explorative moral conversation rather than ‘standing on’ one’s accomplished
theory of right and duty. Leading a moral life is not simply and straightforwardly a matter of
applying theory to practice deductively. For Cavell’s thought, see part three of Cavell ,
and also Bates , who traces the theme of moral conversation throughout Cavell’s career.
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to respect of members of groups, H, I, J… with their local practices? It would be,
arguably, to stop short in reflection, to do a kind of violence to oneself in restricting one’s concept of conscience to the standards of only a distinct and recognizable few whose authority one had internalized, thereby cutting oneself off from
significant practical interaction with members of other groups. It would amount,
as it were, to freezing oneself as a G, acknowledging only the local normative
standards of G-ness. (And of course this goes, conversely, for freezing oneself
in H-ness, I-ness, J-ness and so on too.)
This may sound all too open, tolerant, and pluralist, as though we were to
embrace the normative standards of any group whatsoever. But that is not
right. Rather, from within the development of conscience in initial settings of authoritative others whose standards one internalizes, it is both possible and
worthwhile to develop a generalized conception of the value of respect for
human beings as ends in themselves, that is, as both beings who can set their
own ends and who are capable themselves of normative reflection and the development of a generalized conception of conscience. Such a conception requires a
kind of tolerance and pluralism, but a kind that is compatible with mutual criticism and sharp disagreement.⁴⁰
It is therefore both possible and normatively apt that, as Kant puts it, we will
“with time transform the rude natural predisposition [Anlage] to make moral distinctions into determinate practical principles” on which we may act more effectively, so as to “transform a pathologically compelled agreement to form society
into a moral whole.”⁴¹ “Steps from crudity toward culture”⁴² are possible, and
moral perfection is to be sought and hoped for “from nowhere else but education.”⁴³ There are, however, no guarantees. We may make “the transition from
the go-cart of instinct to the guidance of reason—in a word, from the guardianship of nature into the condition of freedom,”⁴⁴ but that depends on us, specifically, on how we exercise our powers of reflection and commitment first in situations of dependence on a few authoritative others and later in relation to more
wide-ranging encounters.
Apt acknowledgments of a Kantian moral law will, moreover, not be available or fruitful at every historical moment. There are, again, circumstances both

 For an excellent articulation and defense of the kind of toleration that we ought to practise
and that involves and requires mutual engagement and criticism rather than mutual indifference, see Oberdiek .
 Kant c, p. ; first emphasis added.
 Kant c, p. .
 Kant b, p. .
 Kant b, :, p. .
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prior to morality in the Kantian sense (prelinguistic infants; rude conditions of
nomadic life) and beyond morality (extreme emergencies, involving treacheries
and evils to be confronted, where no option is innocent). Bernard Williams is
thus right to some extent when he observes that “the drive toward a rationalistic
conception of rationality comes … from social features of the modern world,
which impose on personal deliberation and on the idea of practical reason itself
a model drawn from a particular understanding of public rationality.”⁴⁵ That is,
it is true that commitment to the relevance of deliberation guided by universal
and impersonal principles has social conditions of emergence, though those conditions, contra Williams, evidently obtained in both fifth century B.C.E. Athens
and in first century C.E. Rome and Palestine, among other places. These conditions arise in various shapes more or less whenever human settlements have become large enough to require significant political and economic role differentiation and regular interactions among occupiers of different roles.

III
It is, then, at least possible to acknowledge from within reflection the requirements of a moral law of respect for human beings, and it is perhaps more likely
for such acknowledgment to be arrived at by more people the less primitive and
the more cosmopolitan the circumstances of life are, where one encounters and
internalizes the normative authority of a wide range of others. But if such acknowledgment does not necessarily take place even in such circumstances,
then what is the normative point of it? Why be moral (by more or less Kantian
lights)?
In Part III of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls undertakes to show that a just
scheme of cooperation, if instituted, would be stable, even in the face of widespread possibilities of free riding. He appeals to existing “relations of friendship
and mutual trust, and the public knowledge of a common … sense of justice”
that is “normally effective” in shaping the actions of most adult subjects of
the scheme.⁴⁶ Those growing up under such a scheme initially lack such relations and such a sense of justice, but they can be expected to develop it, insofar
as it is “given that family institutions are just and that the parents love the child
and manifestly express their love by caring for his good” and given that the child
then “develops ties of friendly feeling and trust toward others in the association

 Williams , p. .
 Rawls , p. .
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as they with evident intention comply with their duties and obligations, and live
up to the ideals of their station.”⁴⁷ One might put this point by saying that the
child’s developing sense of justice sanctifies relations, roles, and values that
are already in place and in which he is coming to participate more self-consciously, just as a declaration of commitment in a marriage ceremony may sanctify a form of mutuality in place that demands continuation and acknowledgment.
Rawls denies that the availability and even the naturalness under favorable
enough conditions of acknowledgment of the moral law constitute a justification
of the obligation to be moral. As he puts it, “these considerations do not determine the … acknowledgment of principles.”⁴⁸ This is in part because he is thinking of justification primarily as a matter of the availability of a set of fully articulated public considerations that are sufficient to determine once and for all a
choice of value schemes from among all plausible available alternatives.⁴⁹ But
that is not the only conception of justification that is relevant to moral theory,
and Rawls also observes that “these considerations … confirm” that acknowledgment and that it may “happen that the superiority of a particular view (among
those currently known) is the result, perhaps the unexpected result, of [a]
newly observed consensus” that is subsequent to critical and comparative reflection. ⁵⁰ From this point of view, the question of how we come developmentally in
favorable enough circumstances to acknowledge the moral law is not in the end
separable from the question of what reasons we have to acknowledge it, even if
the value of such acknowledgment must also always be tested in reflection. We
cannot have, but happily do not need, a justification for being moral “from nowhere,” apart from our location within a set of developing circumstances of life.

 Rawls , p. .
 Rawls , p. .
 “Justification is argument addressed to those who disagree with us, or to ourselves when we
are of two minds. It presumes a clash of views between persons or within one person, and seeks
to convince others, or ourselves, of the reasonableness of the principles upon which our claims
and judgments are founded. Being designed to reconcile by reason, justification proceeds from
what all parties to the discussion hold in common. Ideally, to justify a conception of justice to
someone is to give him a proof of its principles from premises that we both accept, these principles having in turn consequences that match our considered judgments. Thus mere proof is not
justification. A proof simply displays logical relations between propositions. But proofs become
justification once the starting points are mutually recognized, or the conclusions so comprehensive and compelling as to persuade us of the soundness of the conception expressed by their
premises.” (Rawls , p. ).
 Rawls , pp. , .
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The formula of the moral law, in any of its Kantian versions, will not itself be
fixed by a priori reason, but instead held in view as a kind of summary of a commitment that one has come to find unavoidable within one’s life, initially rooted
in the experience of punishment, of a being able to traffic in obligatory, non-instrumental norms.⁵¹ Nor will epistemic certainty be available. Commitment to the
moral law, motivated by critical discernment, will remain an actively maintained
stance, not the product of any discernment-neutral theory modeled on the sciences.⁵² (As Wittgenstein once wrote, “I must plunge into the water of doubt again
and again.”⁵³) But the normative value of maintaining this stance is there to be
discerned from within a wide-range of adequate circumstances, including virtually all non-emergency circumstances within modern settled life and involving
significant interactions across group boundaries. To know the moral law is to acknowledge it from within what, who, and where one is.⁵⁴
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